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“Nous sommes tous américains.” We are all Americans. Such was the rallying cry of the 
French newspaper Le Monde’s editor-in-chief, Jean-Marie Colombani, published two 
days after the terrorist attack against symbols of America’s power. He went on to say: 
“We are all New Yorkers, as surely as John Kennedy declared himself, in 1962 in 
Berlin, to be a Berliner.” If that was one historical resonance that Colombani himself 
called forth for his readers, there is an even older use of this rhetorical call to solidarity 
that may come to mind. It is Jefferson’s call for unity after America’s first taste of two-
party strife. Leading opposition forces to victory in the presidential election of 1800, he 
assured Americans that “We are all Federalists, we are all Republicans,” urging his 
audience to rise above the differences that many at the time feared might divide the 
young nation against itself. There would clearly be no need for such a ringing rhetorical 
call if there were not at the same time an acute sense of difference and division. 
Similarly in the case of Colombani’s timely expression of solidarity with an ally singled 
out for vengeful attack, solely because it, more than any of its allies, had come to 
represent the global challenge posed by a shared Western way of life. An attack against 
America was therefore an attack against common values held dear by all who live by 
standards of democracy and the type of open society that it implies. But as in 
Jefferson’s case, the rhetorical urgency of the call for solidarity suggests a sense of 
difference and divisions now to be transcended, or at least temporarily to be shunted 
aside. This sense of difference had always been there during the years of the Cold War, 
but was contained by the threat of a common enemy. With the end of the Cold War, 
though, the need for a reorientation of strategic thinking was felt on both sides of the 
Atlantic that, if anything, only sharpened differences and divisions.  
Undeniably many changes that occurred during the 1990s are direct 
consequences of the end of the Cold War. To mention just a few of the obvious 
examples, the expansion of the European Union and of NATO into areas under the sway 
of the Soviet Union during the Cold War are attempts at reconfiguring the world that 
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were clearly occasioned by the Soviet Union’s collapse. Similarly, the Balkan wars of 
the 1990s or Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait would likely not have occurred in 
the absence of the breakdown of an international balance of power and ideology and of 
patterns of clientism, typical of the Cold-War world. Most dramatically, perhaps, trans-
Atlantic tensions, never absent during the Cold War but contained by the imperative of 
a joint defense against the Soviet bloc, now appear as clashing visions of the post-Cold 
War new world order. The words—“New World Order”—were coined by George Bush 
the elder, at the time of the first Gulf War, when briefly it seemed as if the framework of 
international institutions, centering on the United Nations, could finally come into its 
own. But the world has moved a long way away from those early hopes and visions. 
And we may well be asking ourselves the question whether the terrorist attack on 
symbols of American power on September 11th, 2001, may not have been a greater sea 
change than the end of the Cold War. Or was it merely the catalyst that led America to 
implement a foreign policy approach that had been in the making since the early 1990s? 
If so, and it seems likely it is, America’s current foreign policy is clearly a response to 
its unique position of the one hegemon in a unipolar world, intent on safeguarding that 
position. A group of neo-conservative foreign-policy analysts took their cue from a 
White Paper produced in 1992 at the behest of William Cheney, then Secretary of 
Defense, entitled “The New American Century.”  In 1997 they coalesced around the 
Project for a New American Century and founded a think-tank under that name. Their 
thinking hardened around a view of American foreign policy, centering on military 
strength. Now, in the current Bush administration, they are in a position to implement 
their views. Parallel to this gestation of a foreign-policy view, in American society 
throughout the 1990s national rituals such as the Super Bowl increasingly blended the 
appeal of mass spectator sports with displays of military prowess and martial vigor.1 It 
may herald a militarization of the public spirit, propagated through the mass media. To 
some it is eerily reminiscent of earlier such public stagings, as at the time of the 1936 
Olympics in Nazi Germany. It may have readied the American  public’s mind for the 
later curtailment of democratic rights through the Patriot Act and the emergence of a 
                                                 
1  On this topic see Jaap Kooijman, “Bombs Bursting in Air: The Gulf War, 9/11, and the Super Bowl 
Performances of ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ by Whitney Houston and Mariah Carey,” in: Ruud 
Janssens and Rob Kroes, eds., Post-Cold War Europe, Post-Cold War America (Amsterdam: VU 
University Press, 2004), 178-94. 
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national security state at the hands of the current Bush administration. In a recent article 
American philosopher Richard Rorty warned Europeans that institutional changes made 
in the name of the war on terrorism could bring about the end of the rule of law in both 
the U.S. and Europe. Remarkably, he forgot to mention that many of these changes had 
already come to the United States, without much public debate or resistance.2 
 Much as the entire world may have changed in the wake of the Cold War, my 
focus shall be on the particular ways these changes have affected Europe and the United 
States, internally as well as in their trans-Atlantic relation. An important aspect is the 
way Europeans and Americans have begun to redefine each other, in response to a 
creeping alienation that has affected public opinion and public discourse on both sides 
of the Atlantic. If increasingly each side appears to the other as “Other,” as more alien 
than at any point during the Cold War, the construction of this perspective is not 
entirely new. It draws on older repertoires of anti-Americanism in Europe, or of anti-
Europeanism in the United States, as illustrated by Secretary Rumsfeld’s snide 
reference to “old Europe.” Yet there may be a new, and more ominous, ring to these 
revived repertoires. They may also strike responsive chords among people who 
previously thought they were free from such adversarial sentiments.  
 
In what follows I wish to explore this new resonance. It is partly a personal account, an 
attempt at introspection, tracing emotional and affective shifts in the way I perceive and 
experience America. Let me begin with a necessary proviso. Recently, in a piece in the 
French newspaper Le Monde,3 Alfred Grosser reminded us that one need not be anti-
American for opposing America’s foreign policy, nor an anti-Semite or anti-Zionist for 
taking Israeli government policy to task. He is not the first to make the point, nor will he 
be the last. The point bears making time and time again. Too often the cry of anti-
Americanism or anti-Semitism is used as a cheap debating trick to silence voices of 
unwelcome criticism. Like Grosser I have studied forms of anti-Americanism for years, 
trying to understand what triggers it, trying to understand the logic of its inner structure, 
while looking at it from a rather Olympian height. More often than not the subject had 
                                                 
2  Richard Rorty, “Post-Democracy,” London Review of Books (1 April 2004). In a spirited response, as yet 
unpublished, Tomas Mastnak, currently a fellow at the International Center for Advanced Studies at 
New York University took Rorty to task for ignoring recent trends in the United States.  
3  Alfred Grosser, “Les hors-la-loi,” Le monde, Friday, 18 April 2003. (reprinted in Le monde, Sélection 
hebdomadaire,  (no. 2842, 26 April 2003) p.8. 
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seemed more meaningfully connected to the non-American settings where it appeared 
than to America itself.  But like Grosser I now feel the need to make a point that had for 
so long seemed obvious. He and I and many others now feel a stronger urge to take our 
distance from the directions that American foreign policy is taking, and ironically are 
now confronting the charge that we have become anti-American. A topic of intellectual 
and scholarly interest has now assumed the poignancy of a private dilemma. Grosser 
and I and others know we have not turned anti-American, while having become critical 
of the turn American policies have taken. We are now facing the question of when a 
stance critical of specific American policies becomes anti-American. For that shift to 
occur, more is needed than disagreement, however vehement. Anti-Americanism 
typically proceeds from specific areas of disagreement to larger frameworks of 
rejection, seeing particular policies or particular events as typical of a more general 
image of America. Anti-Americanism in that sense is mostly reductionist, seeing only 
the simplicity of the cowboy and Texas provincialism in President George W. Bush’s 
response to terrorism, or the expansionist thrust of American capitalism in Bush’s 
Middle-East policies. And so on, and so forth. Entire repertoires of stereotyped 
Americas can be conjured up to account for any contemporary trans-Atlantic 
disagreements.  
 To the extent that for people like Grosser and me the topic of anti-Americanism 
has come home to roost, the following section illustrates the before-and-after quality of 
my involvement with the topic. It is in part a personal account of my attempts to keep 
my feelings of alienation and anger over recent trends in America’s foreign policy from 
alienating me from America more generally. It is the report of a balancing act. 
 
I happened to be in the United States on the dismal day of September 11th, 2001. I had 
flown in from Washington DC to Logan Airport in Boston the previous evening, hours 
before knife-wielding terrorists highjacked civilian airplanes taking off from Logan. I 
stood transfixed in front of the television screen, impotenly watching the second plane 
crash into the second of Manhattan’s Twin Towers, then seeing them implode—almost 
in slow motion, as I remember it. A year later I was back in the United States, watching 
how Americans remembered the events of the year before in a moving, simple 
ceremony. The list of names was being read of all those who lost their lives in the 
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towering inferno of the World Trade Center. Their names appropriately reflect what the 
words World Trade Center conjure up; they are names of people from all over the 
world, from Africa, the Middle East, the Far East, the Pacific,  Latin America, Europe, 
and of course North America—people of many cultures and many religions. Again the 
whole world was watching, and I suddenly realized that something remarkable was 
happening. The American mass media recorded an event staged by Americans. 
Americans powerfully re-appropriated a place where a year ago international terrorism 
was in charge. They literally turned the site into a lieu de mémoire. They were in the 
words of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, read again on this occasion, consecrating the 
place. They imbued it with the sense and meaning of a typically American scripture. It 
is the language that, for over two centuries, has defined America’s purpose and mission 
in the ringing words of freedom and democracy. 
 I borrow the words “American scripture” from Michael Ignatieff. He used them 
in a piece he wrote for a special issue of Granta.4 He is one of twenty-four writers from 
various parts of the world who contributed to a section entitled “What We Think of 
America.” Ignatieff describes American scripture as “the treasure house of language, at 
once sacred and profane, to renew the faith of the only country on earth (...) whose 
citizenship is an act of faith, the only country whose promises to itself continue to 
command the faith of people like me, who are not its citizens.” Ignatieff is a Canadian. 
He describes a faith and an affinity with American hopes and dreams that many non-
Americans share. Yet, if it was the point of Granta’s editors to explore the question of 
“Why others hate us, Americans,” Ignatieff’s view is not of much help. In the outside 
world after 9/11, as Granta’s editor, Ian Jack, reminds us, there was a wide-spread 
feeling that “Americans had it coming to them”, that it was “good that Americans now 
know what it’s like to be vulnerable.” For people who share such views American 
scripture deconstructs into hypocrisy and willful deceit. They may well see their views 
confirmed now that America is engaged in an occupation of Iraq, advertised as an 
intervention to bring democracy to that country, while in fact engaging in acts that may 
well be war crimes in terms of international treaties that count the U.S. among its co-
signatories. 
                                                 
4  Michael Ignatieff, “What we think of America,” Granta, 77 (Spring 2002), 47-50. 
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 There are many signs in the recent past of people’s views of America shifting in 
the direction of disenchantment and disillusionment. Sure enough, there were fine 
moments when President Bush rose to the occasion and used the hallowed words of 
American scripture to make it clear to the world and his fellow-Americans what 
terrorism had truly attacked. The terrorists’ aim had been more than symbols of 
American power and prowess. It had been the very values of freedom and democracy 
that America sees as its foundation. These were moments when the president literally 
seemed to rise above himself. But it was never long before he showed a face of America 
that had already worried many long-time friends and allies during Bush’s first year in 
office.   
 Even before September 11th, the Bush administration had signaled its retreat 
from the internationalism that had consistently inspired U.S. foreign policy since World 
War II, if not before. Ever since Woodrow Wilson American scripture had also come to 
imply the vision of a world order that would forever transcend the lawlessness of 
international relations. Many of the international organizations that now serve to 
regulate inter-state relations and give legitimacy to international actions bear a markedly 
American imprint, and spring from American ideals and initiatives. President Bush Sr., 
in spite of his avowed aversion to the “vision thing,” nevertheless deemed it essential to 
speak of a New World Order when at the end of the Cold War Saddam Hussein’s 
invasion of Kuwait seemed to signal a relapse into a state of international lawlessness. 
Bush Jr. takes a narrower, national-interest view of America’s place in the world. In an 
un-abashed unilateralism he has moved United States foreign policy away from high-
minded idealism and the arena of international treaty obligations. He is actively 
undermining the fledgling International Criminal Court in The Hague, rather than taking 
a leadership role in making it work. He displays a consistent unwillingness to play by 
rules internationally agreed and to abide by decisions reached by international bodies 
that the United States itself has helped set up. He squarely places the United States 
above or outside the reach of international law, seeing himself as the sole and final 
arbiter of America’s national interest.  
 After September 11th this outlook has only hardened. The overriding view of 
international relations in terms of the war against terrorism has led the United States to 
ride roughshod over its own Constitutional protection of civil rights as well as over 
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international treaty obligations under the Convention of Geneva in the ways it handles 
individuals, US citizens among them, suspected of links to terrorist networks. Seeing 
anti-terrorism as the one way to define who is with America or against it, president 
Bush takes forms of state terrorism, whether in Russia against the Chechens, or in Israel 
against the Palestinians, as so many justified anti-terrorist efforts. He gives them his full 
support. He calls Sharon a “man of peace” and has pre-empted future negotiations 
between the Palestinians and the Israelis by supporting strategic Israeli positions 
regarding the Palestinians’ rights of return under international law, or Israeli settlement 
of occupied Palestinian land, which is against international law. If Europeans beg to 
differ and wish to take a more balanced view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Bush 
administration and many op-ed voices in the United States blame European anti-
Semitism.  
 This latter area is probably the one where the dramatic, if not tragic, drifting 
apart of America and Europe comes out most starkly. It testifies to a slow separation of 
the terms of public debate. Thus, to give an example, in England the chief rabbi, 
Jonathan Sacks,5 said that many of the things Israel did to the Palestinians flew in the 
face of the values of Judaism. “(They) make me feel very uncomfortable as a Jew.” He 
had always believed, he said, that Israel “must give back all the land (taken in 1967) for 
the sake of peace.” Peaceniks in Israel, like Amos Oz, take similar views. Even more 
remarkably, in the wake of the recent rampage of the Israeli army in the Gaza strip that 
left 1600 Palestinians homeless, Tommy Lapid, the justice minister and the only 
Holocaust survivor in the Israeli government, declared that the house demolitions were 
inhumane. As the Guardian Weekly quoted him, he said: “The demolition of houses in 
Rafah must stop. It is not humane, not Jewish, and causes us grave damage in the world. 
At the end of the day, they will kick us out of the United Nations, try those responsible 
in the international court in The Hague, and no one will want to speak to us.”6 Many in 
Europe, Jews and non-Jews alike, would agree. And they have the chance to do so, 
because Israeli voices like Lapid’s are being aired in the European press. Leading 
quality newspapers, in France, in England, in Germany, as well as in other European 
countries, do what top-notch journalism is all about: to write contemporary history as it 
unfolds, with all its welcome and unwelcome sides. Leading journalists as well as 
                                                 
5  See the interview in the Guardian on August 27th, 2003. 
6  Guardian Weekly, May 28-June 3, 2004, p. 7.  
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editorial writers are not loath to say the unwelcome things and confront their readers 
with all the tragic complexity of life in the Middle East. 
Yet it would be hard to hear similar views expressed in the United States other 
than in the U.S. equivalent of the Soviet Samizdat voice of dissent: an equivalent that 
avails itself of the Internet for the spirited exchange of dissenting views. In the public 
realm there is a closing of ranks, among American Jews, the religious right, opinion 
leaders, and Washington political circles, behind the view that everything Israel does to 
the Palestinians is done in legitimate self-defense against acts of terrorism. Yet, clearly, 
if America’s overriding foreign-policy concern is the war against terrorism, one element 
tragically lacking in public policy statements of its Middle-East policy is the attempt to 
look at themselves through the eyes of Arabs, or more particularly Palestinians. A 
conflation seems to have occurred between Israel’s national interest and that of the 
United States, as in the case of Richard Perle, foreign policy guru in Washington 
government circles, who did not see any conflict of interest (personal or national) in 
drafting policy documents for Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud Party in Israel in 1997. 
Both countries, at the official level, share a definition of the situation that blinkers them 
to rival views more openly discussed in Europe.  
 Among the pieces in Granta is one by a Palestinian writer, Raja Shehadeh. He 
reminds the reader that “today there are more Ramallah people in the US than in 
Ramallah. Before 1967 that was how most Palestinians related to America—via the 
good things about the country that they heard from their migrant friends and relations. 
After 1967, America entered our life in a different way.” The author goes on to say that 
the Israeli occupation policy of expropriating Arab land to build Jewish settlements and 
roads to connect them, while deploying soldiers to protect settlers, would never have 
been possible without “American largesse.” But American assistance, Shehadeh 
continues, did not stop at the funding of ideologically motivated programs. In a personal 
vignette, more telling than any newspaper reports, Shehadeh writes: “Last July my 
cousin was at a wedding reception in a hotel on the southern outskirts of Ramallah when 
an F16 fighter jet dropped a hundred-pound bomb on a nearby building. Everything had 
been quiet. There had not been any warning of an imminent air attack. … Something 
happened to my cousin that evening. ... He felt he had died and was surprised afterwards 
to find he was still alive. ... He did not hate America. He studied there. ... Yet when I 
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asked him what he thought of the country he indicated that he dismissed it as a lackey of 
Israel, giving it unlimited assistance and never censoring its use of US weaponry against 
innocent civilians.” The author concludes with these words: “Most Americans may 
never know why my cousin turned his back on their country. But in America the parts 
are larger than the whole. It is still possible that the optimism, energy and opposition of 
Americans in their diversity may yet turn the tide and make America listen.”  
 The current Bush administration, with its pre-emptive strategy of taking out 
opponents before they can harm the US at home or abroad, in much the same way that 
Israeli fighter jets assassinate alleged Palestinian terrorists, in their cars, homes, and 
backyards, without bothering about due process or collateral damage, is not an America 
that one may hope “to make listen.” Who is not for Bush is against him. Well, so be it. 
Many Europeans have chosen not to be bullied into sharing the Bush administration’s 
view of the world. They may not command as many divisions as Bush, they surely can 
handle the “divisions” that Bush—the man who in the 2000 election campaign had 
portrayed himself as a uniter, not a divider—has inflicted on the Atlantic community, if 
not on Europe itself.  
 If there is division now in the way that many Europeans “read” the events in the 
Middle East compared to Americans, it is surely a matter of different exposure to the 
daily news, which in Europe is presented less selectively, and in a less biased way. Even 
today, a full year after President Bush declared the Iraqi mission “accomplished,” many 
American reporters in Iraq voluntarily embed themselves for their own safety in U.S. 
Marine encampments. As one correspondent, Pamela Constable of The Washington 
Post, described her experience: “I quickly became part of an all-American military 
microcosm.”7 As Michael Massing argues in a piece in The New York Review of Books, 
if US news organizations truly want to get inside events in Iraq, there’s a clear step they 
could take: incorporating more reporting and footage from international news 
organizations. Arabic-language TV stations have a wide presence on the ground. 
European outlets like the BBC, the Guardian, The Financial Times, The Independent, 
and Le Monde have Arabic-speaking correspondents with close knowledge of the 
Middle East. Reuters, The Associated press, and Agence France-Presse have many 
correspondents stationed in places where US organizations do not. As Michael Massing 
                                                 
7  The quotation is by Michael Massing, “Unfit to Print?” New York Review of Books, LI (11) June 24, 
2004, p. 8. 
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writes in conclusion of his piece: “In the current climate, of course, any use of Arab or 
European material—no matter how thoroughly edited and checked—could elicit 
charges of liberalism and anti-Americanism. The question for American journalists is 
whether they really want to know what the Iraqis themselves, in all their complexity, are 
thinking and feeling.”8 It is a charge against a blinkered and parochial American 
journalism that is more generally made in European attempts at fathoming the depths of 
the divide between American and European public discourse.9 A free press, as the 
highly regarded author and war correspondent Philip Knightley noted in Index on 
Censorship, would not reduce the post-September 11 debate to “abuse, incitement, 
personal attacks, inflammatory accusation and intimidation until many a commentator 
and intellectual, the very people whose voices we want to hear, have been cowed into 
silence.”10 Or driven underground, we might add, into the American Internet form of 
Samizdat dissent. 
But there may also be a deeper force at work. Tellingly, the Guardian referred to 
Tommy Lapid as the sole Holocaust survivor in the current Israeli government. If World 
War II memories may have resurfaced in his reading of the Gaza events, something 
similar may be at work on a more general scale among European audiences. 
Photographs from Palestine or Iraq may well bring back memories of German 
retaliatory action against villages in Europe, they may also bring back remembered 
photographs of World War II atrocities used so powerfully in the education of 
Europeans regarding the enormity of Nazi rule. They trigger a submerged reservoir that 
Europeans do not share with Americans.  Yet this basic difference need not drive the 
two sides of the Atlantic apart. When Europeans saw their tragic history repeat itself in 
the 1990’s Balkan Wars, in the end united action under NATO auspices put an end to 
the atrocities perpetrated there. Americans and Europeans in the end could share a 
                                                 
8  Idem, p. 10. 
9  See, e.g., the chapter “America and the World as America,” in: Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl Wyn Davies, 
Why Do People Hate America? (Cambridge: ICON Books, 2002) Similar best-selling indictments, in 
languages other than English, of America’s recent course in world politics and the failure of the 
American press to take an independent and critical position, are e.g., Hans Leyendecker, Die Lügen des 
Weissen Hauses: Warum Amerika einen Neuanfang braucht [The Lies of the White House: Why 
America Needs a New Start] (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2004), Karel van Wolferen, De 
ondergang van een wereldorde [The Demise of a World Order] (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Contact, 2003), 
or Denise Artaud, L’Amérique des néoconservateurs: L’Empire a-t-il un avenir? (Paris: Editions 
Ellipses, 2004).  
10  Philip Knightley, “Losing Friends and Influencing People,” Index on Censorship, January 2002, 31 (1), 
pp. 146-55. 
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reading in terms of crimes against humanity. Precisely such a shared reading of events 
in the Middle East and their implications for foreign policy seems to be lacking. A 
widely shared sense of outrage among Europeans, fed by the daily exposure to pictures 
and news reports from the Middle East, translates into impotent anger at an American 
Middle-East policy seen as lacking balance and fairness. 
 There has been a resurgence of open anti-Americanism in Europe and elsewhere 
in the world. Not least in the Middle East, the area that has brought us Osama Bin 
Laden and his paranoid hatred of America, and of the West more generally. But if he 
can still conflate the two—America and the West—why can’t we? If Raja Shehadeh 
still holds hopes of an America that one can make listen, why don’t we? Let us face it: 
We are all Americans, but sometimes it is hard to see the Americans we hold dear in the 
Americans that hold sway. Those are the dangerous moments when clashing policy 
views may assume the contours of deeper, more fundamental differences—when 
difference translates into incompatibility, and the face of just one president may seem to 
reflect an America that has changed its face more permanently and fundamentally.  
What different kind of face could that be? As some see it, it may have begun to 
show the effects of long-term cultural trends that increasingly set America apart from 
Europe. According to the World Values Survey, a long-term survey research project of 
the University of Michigan, the over-all picture is ambivalent.11 America consistently 
scores as high as or higher than European countries when it comes to values to do with 
political or economic freedoms. Americans and Europeans share ideas of democracy 
and freedom and have a common interest in defending those ideas. But the Michigan 
project also looked at a different set of values and ranks countries along a conceptual 
axis ranging from traditionalism to secularism. Traditionalism comprises those views 
that give central place to religion, family, and country. At the other end we find the 
secular-rational values that emphasize individual choice in matters of life style and 
individual emancipation from older frameworks of affiliation such as the church or the 
fatherland. America’s position on this scale is exceptional among Western countries. It 
leans much more strongly towards the traditionalist end of the scale than European 
countries (with the exception of Ireland). Americans are the most patriotic of Western 
nations: 72% claim to be “very proud” of their country, thus putting themselves 
                                                 
11  Ronald L. Inglehart, ed., Human Values and Social Change: Findings from the World Values Surveys 
(International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology, 89). 
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alongside such countries as India and Turkey. Religion—according to the survey the 
single most important gauge of traditionalism—positions Americans closer to Nigerians 
and Turks than to Swedes or Germans. And the differences with North-Western 
European countries have, if anything, only increased. Since the first survey, in 1981, 
America has grown more traditional, Europe less. Yet in terms of the other set of 
values, those of democracy and freedom, they have moved in tandem. 
 From these survey data America appears as a country of a cultural ambivalence 
all its own, in an evolving ideosyncratic symbiosis of traditionalism and modernism. 
The historical dynamics of this symbiosis, with the growing influence of traditionalism, 
may well have contributed to the mutual alienation between Europe and America. 
Public discourse on either side of the Atlantic is losing its shared terms of reference. 
America’s political establishment has long been the safe haven of a secular, 
Enlightenment world view which it shared with political elites in Europe. Slowly but 
surely, however, traditionalism has made inroads into America’s centers of policy-
making. Of the two main political parties, the Republican Party has targeted its political 
strategy toward the incorporation of the traditionalist segment among the electorate. The 
strategy is two-pronged. Contemporary traditionalism has thrived on the ongoing 
culture war against anything connected to the life style revolution of the 1960s. Its anti-
modernism may remind us of an earlier high water mark of traditionalism in the 1920s, 
forever epitomized in the anti-Darwinian Scopes (or “monkey”) trial. At the time it may 
have seemed like traditionalism’s last hurrah. Yet with great organizational acumen it 
has made a remarkable come-back, waging a cultural war on the forces of moral 
relativism and libertarianism unleashed in the 1960s. Having gotten its act together 
politically it offers itself as a tempting electoral bloc to the Republican Party. Yet the 
Republican Party is not solely the passive recipient of such support. It has chosen 
actively to play on the cultural fears of the traditionalists, posturing as the champion of 
all those who see gay marriage, abortion, divorce and more such moral issues as 
defining the political agenda, while casting the Democrats as representing moral 
depravity.  
If we can discern two different Americas—the one modern and secular, the other 
centered on traditional values—they seem to coincide with one or the other of the two 
main parties. America seems to be split down the middle, with its two halves cohabiting 
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in delicate balance. Visiting Europeans, journalists and diplomats among them, cannot 
fail to notice the wide-spread alienation from the Bush administration precisely based 
on a cultural rift as outlined here. This view has become common coinage in press 
commentaries, in Le Monde in France, in The Guardian in England, in the Frankfurter 
Algemeine in Germany, to name just three of the more influentional, opinion-forming 
newspapers in Europe.  
Affiliating with the urbane and modern America, as many Europeans are wont to 
do, they may tend to exaggerate the “moral issues” divide as the single most important 
determining factor in the Republican Party’s electoral strength. However, exit poll and 
public opinion data may well suggest that fear of a different sort has assured Bush’s re-
election.12 Against the backdrop of the war on terror, keeping its ugly face from the 
general public, yet cynically manipulating alarm stages, casting Bush as the decisive 
war leader while painting the opponent as a flip-flopper, the Republican Party’s 
electoral strategy has succesfully managed to rally those voting on their fears behind it. 
There is an Orwellian 1984 quality about this, with ongoing low-level warfare and 
scare-mongering preparing a population to surrender their democratic freedoms.  
The highly partisan nature of such recent trends may remind Europeans that anti-
Americanism is not the point. We may believe we recognize a generic Americanism in 
any particular American behavior, be it cultural or political. Yet the range of such 
behavior is simply too wide—ranging  in culture from the sublime to the vulgar, and in 
politics from high-minded internationalism to narrow nationalism—to warrant any 
across-the-board rejection. Anti-Americanism, if we choose to retain the term at all, 
should be seen as a weak and ambivalent complex of anti-feelings. It does not apply but 
selectively, never extending to a total rejection of both forms of Americanism: the 
cultural and the political. Thus we can have either of two separate outcomes; an anti-
Americanism rejecting cultural trends which are seen as typically American, while 
allowing of admiration for America’s energy, innovation, prowess, and optimism, or an 
anti-Americanism in reverse, rejecting an American political creed that for all its 
missionary zeal is perceived as imperialist and oppressive, while admiring American 
culture, from its high-brow to its pop varieties. These opposed directions in the critical 
thrust of anti-Americanism often go hand in hand with opposed positions on the 
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political spectrum. The cultural anti-Americanism of those rising in defense of Europe’s 
cultural identities is typically on the conservative right wing, whereas the political anti-
Americanism of the Cold War and the war in Vietnam typically occurred on the left. 
Undoubtedly the drastic change in America’s position on the world stage since World 
War II has contributed to this double somersault. Since that war America has appeared 
in a radically different guise, as much more of a potent force in every-day life in Europe 
and the larger world than ever before.  
As we all know, there is a long history that illustrates Europe’s long and abiding 
affinity with America’s daring leap into an age of modernity. It shared America’s 
fascination with the political modernity of republicanism, of democracy and 
egalitarianism, with the economic modernity of progress in a capitalist vein, and with an 
existential modernity that saw Man, with a capital M and in the gender-free sense of the 
word, as the agent of history, the molder of his social life as well as of his own 
individual identity and destiny. It was after all a Frenchman, Crèvecoeur, who on the 
eve of American independence pondered the question of “What, then, is the American, 
this new Man.” A long line of European observers have, in lasting fascination, 
commented on this American venture, seeing it as a trajectory akin to their own hopes 
and dreams for Europe.13 Similarly, French immigrants in the United States, in order to 
legitimize their claims for ethnic specificity, have always emphasized the historical 
nexus of French and American political ideals, elevating Lafayette alongside George 
Washington to equal iconic status.14   
 But as we also know, there is an equally long history of a French, and more 
generally European, awareness of American culture taking directions that were seen as a 
threat to European ways of life and views of culture. Whether it was Tocqueville’s more 
sociological intuition of an egalitarian society breeding cultural homogeneity and 
conformism, or later views that sought the explanation in the economic logic of a free 
and unfettered market, the fear was of an erosion of the European cultural landscape, of 
European standards of taste and cultural value. As I have argued elsewhere, the French 
were not alone in harboring such fears,15 but they have been more consistently adamant 
                                                 
13  I may refer the reader to my survey of such French views of American modernity. See Rob Kroes, Them 
and Us: Questions of Citizenship in a Globalizing World (University of Illinois Press, 2000), chapter 9. 
14  See, e.g., Annick Foucrier, Le rêve californien: Migrants francais sur la côte Pacifique (XVIIIe-XXe 
siècles).  (Paris, 1999). 
15  See my If You’ve Seen One, You’ve Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture. (University 
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in making the case for a defense of their national identity against a threatening process 
of Americanization. The very word is a French coinage. It was Baudelaire who, on the 
occasion of the 1855 Exposition Universelle de Paris, spoke of modern man, set on a 
course of technical materialism, as “tellement américanisé … qu’il a perdu la notion des 
différences qui caractérisent les phénomènes du monde physique et du monde moral, du 
naturel et du surnaturel.”16 The Goncourt brothers’ Journal, from the time of the second 
exposition in 1867, refers to “L’exposition universelle, le dernier coup à ce qui est 
l’américanisation de la France.”17 As these critics saw it, industrial progress ushered in 
an era where quantity would replace quality and where a mass culture feeding on 
standardization would erode established taste hierarchies. There are echoes of 
Tocqueville here, yet the eroding factor is no longer the egalitarian logic of mass 
democracy but the logic of industrial progress. In both cases, however, whatever the 
precise link and evaluating angle, America had become the metonym for unfettered 
modernity, like a Prometheus unbound.  
 These longer lines of anti-Americanism, cultural and political, are alive and well 
today. And often the two blend into one. Whenever Europeans, particularly young ones 
dressed in blue jeans and T-shirts, rise in protest against American interventions on the 
world stage, they go out and smash the windows of a nearby McDonald’s (and there is 
always a McDonald’s nearby). As an icon of America’s global presence, it represents in 
the eyes of protesters America’s cultural imperialism, but it serves equally well as an 
emblem of political imperialism. The protest is facile and inarticulate, yet it serves to 
make a point against American power seen as overbearing and unresponsive. But how 
about the recent surge of anti-Europeanism in the United States? 
 
Given Europe’s daring post-World War II venture in the construction of a European 
Union, inventing proto-federalist forms in the search for a supra-national Europe, how 
do we account for the recent resurgence of anti-Europeanism in the United States? 
Having promoted and supported this European evolution for many decades, why have 
so many American opinion leaders now turned anti-European? In the vitriolic 
vituperation that has recently set the tone of trans-Atlantic exchanges leading American 
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16  Quoted in: D. Lacorne, J Rupnik, and M.F. Toinet, eds., L’Amérique dans les têtes (Paris, 1986), 61. 
17  Quoted in ibid., 62. 
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voices discard as the “Old Europe” those countries that criticize the drift of American 
foreign policy, while hailing other countries as the “New Europe” that are willing to 
follow in America’s footsteps. Robert Kagan contributed to this rising anti-Europeanism 
in the United States when he paraphrased the dictum that men are from Mars, women 
from Venus. As he chose to present the two poles, Americans now are the new 
Martians, while Europeans are the new Venutians. Never mind the gendering implied in 
his view that Europeans are collectively engaged in a feminine endeavor when they 
pursue the new, transnational and cosmopolitan Europe. He does make an astute point, 
though, when he describes the European quest as Kantian, as an endeavor to create a 
transnational space where laws and civility rule. As Kagan sees it, though, the 
Europeans are so self-immersed that they are forgetful of a larger world that is 
Hobbesian, not Kantian, and is a threat to them as much as to the United States. To the 
extent that Europeans still involve themselves in the larger world they tend to 
emphasize peace-keeping operations rather than pre-emptive military strikes.18 
 Kagan and many others tend to forget that it has taken the United States about a 
hundred years to find and test its institutional forms and build a nation of Americans 
from people flooding to its shores from all over the world. It could only have done so 
while turning its back to the world, in self-chosen isolationism, under the protective 
umbrella of a Pax Brittannica. Europe has had only some forty years to turn its gaze 
inward when it engaged in shaping the contours of a new Europe. During those years it 
enjoyed in its turn the protection of an umbrella, provided this time by the Pax 
Americana. This constellation came to an end along with the Cold War. Yet only then 
could the European construction fully come into its own, conceiving of the new Europe 
on the scale of the entire continent. It is a tremendous challenge and Europe needs time 
to cope with it. If it succeeds it may well serve as a model to the world, a rival to the 
American ideal of transnationalism, of constituting a nation of nations. If they are rival 
models, they are at the same time of one kind. They are variations on larger ideals 
inspiring the idea of Western civilization and find their roots in truly European 
formative moments in history, in the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the 
Enlightenment. Larry Siedentop places the formative moment even earlier in time, 
coinciding with the rise of a Christian view of the universal equality of mankind vis-à-
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vis God. As he presents it, the formative moment consisted in universalizing a religious 
view that in Judaism was still highly particularist, claiming an exceptionalist relation 
between God and the people of Israel.19 This shared heritage inspired the first trans-
Atlantic readings of what the terrorist attack of 9/11 signified. It was seen as an 
onslaught on the core values of a shared civilization. How ironic, if not tragic, then, that 
before long the United States and Europe parted ways in finding the proper response to 
the new threat of international terrorism.  
As for the United States, the first signs of its farewell to internationalism in 
foreign policy—to its Wilsonianism, if you wish—and to its pioneering role in 
designing the institutional and legal framework for peaceful inter-state relations in the 
world, had, as I pointed out before, actually preceded 9/11. No longer does the Bush 
administration conceive of the United States as the primus inter pares, setting the 
guidelines for collective action while seeking legitimacy for action through treaties and 
United Nations resolutions. As the one hegemon on the world stage it now feels free to 
pursue its national interest through policies that one can only describe as unilateralist. It 
may seem like a throwback to the time of nation state sovereignty, a stage of history that 
Europe is struggling to transcend. Unspectacular and cumbersome as the European 
project may seem, it is already rich in achievement. It has brought together long-time 
enemies like Germany and France, it has admitted as democratic member states nations 
that quite recently knew fascist dictatorships, like Italy, Spain, and Portugal, or that 
were under the heel of military dictators, like Greece. It recently admitted nations that 
had lived under Communist rule since World War II. Turkey, a long-time member of 
NATO and since 1949 a member of the Council of Europe and subscriber to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, is now busy getting its house in democratic 
order so as to qualify for membership of the European Union.  
If the European project is successful—and this means the inclusion of Turkey—
Europe, I strongly believe, would offer a model to the world, particularly the world of 
Islam or for that matter the state of Israel, of a civil and democratic order, multi-national 
and multi-cultural, far more tempting than the version of democracy brought under 
American auspices through pre-emptive military invasion. Those in support of what the 
United States are pursuing in Iraq, blithely call it a neo-Wilsonianism. I beg to differ. If 
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there is a neo-Wilsonian promise, it is held by the new Europe, not the current Bush 
administration. 
 
In the European repertoire of the cultural critique of America, one observation may have 
gained in poignancy. Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre in France, or Oswald Spengler 
in Germany, have been among those who noted an absence in America of the European 
sense of the tragic. In the blithe meliorism of the American project to bring democracy 
to the Middle East, what is lacking is the awareness that the active pursuit of good ends 
may well result in achieving its opposite. As in classic Greek tragedy, the Gods may 
strike with blindness those they wish to destroy. In the case of America’s forward 
defense of democracy in Iraq, though, the blindness may be self-inflicted, as if its 
leaders were in a pathological state of denial.  When the shocking pictures of systematic 
humiliation of Iraqi prisoners entered the public realm, President Bush and Secretary 
Rumsfeld dismissed the acts as un-American. If this is what Americans did, it is not 
what Americans would do. America is inherently good.20 Among many others, Romano 
Prodi, president of the European Commission in Brussels, begged to differ. Never one 
to mince words, he affirmed that the Iraq tortures were war crimes, which, for him, 
made it difficult to see the American presence in Iraq as a peace mission. Others, of a 
subtler cast of mind, expressed similar views. Thus, in an interview in the Süddeutsche 
Zeitung on the occasion of his 75th birthday,21 German philosopher Jürgen Habermas 
testified to his disillusionment and disenchantment with the current U.S. administration 
and its standard bearers. The experience was all the more painful since, as he 
acknowledged, he could not have come into his own as a philosopher of public space 
and democratic debate without the impact of America’s pluralist liberalism and its 
philosophy of pragmatism. Ever since he was sixteen, his political ideas had been 
nourished by the American enlightenment ideals, thanks to a sensible reeducation policy 
in the postwar years of American occupation in Germany. But now, in a recent book on 
the divided West, he has this to say: “Let us not delude ourselves: The normative 
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authority of America lies in shatters.”22 The official manipulation of public opinion and 
the rampant patriotic conformism he said he would not have deemed possible in the 
liberal America that he envisions.  
 Let me return to the editor-in-chief of Le Monde, Jean-Marie Colombani. Like 
Habermas his feelings about America have followed a curve from affiliation all the way 
to alienation, only in a shorter time span. In a May, 2004, editorial entitled “Are We All 
Un-American?”,23 he comments on Rumsfeld’s facile dismissal of the Abu Ghraib 
abominations as un-American. If this implies a definition of true Americanism, it is one 
that Colombani refuses to share. As Colombani put it: “In the wake of September 11, 
we all felt ourselves to be Americans. Donald Rumsfeld would make us all un-
American.” I tend to agree. If the Bush administration shows us the face of a self-
righteous, arrogant, and unbridled Americanism, it is an Americanism that I oppose.  
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